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Network Neutrality: Justifiable Discrimination,
Unjustifiable Discrimination, and the Bright Line
Between Them 
Noel Semple†
Abstract 
his paper proposes a bright line test to guide the Canadian Radio-television and TelecommunicationsT Commission (‘‘CRTC’’) in regulating ‘‘network neutrality’’. When Internet service providers seek to discrimi-
nate between uses and users in administering their networks, the CRTC should ask whether the proposed
discrimination is a reasonable effort to make the price paid by each user commensurate to the demands which his
or her use places on the network. Discrimination which meets this description should be tolerated if not actively
encouraged, because it encourages the economically efficient allocation of scarce bandwidth. All other forms of
ISP discrimination — including discrimination based on aesthetic judgments and profit-seeking discrimination in
favour of owned or affiliated content — should be restrained by the CRTC, relying on subsection 27(2) of the
Telecommunications Act. Strong moral and economic arguments support the imposition of this limited neutrality
regime, and only a few minor reforms would be required to put it into place.
vice experienced by a user proportional to the demandsIntroduction 
that he or she places on the network is justifiable,
whereas most other forms of discrimination are unjustifi-hould the right of Internet service providers (‘‘ISPs’’)
able. I argue that restricting ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimina-S to discriminate between users and uses in adminis-
tion is both ethically and economically justified by thetrating their networks be constrained by regulation?1
public interest in network neutrality. The fourth andThose who answer in the affirmative appeal for ‘‘network
final Part of this paper will briefly describe the policyneutrality’’; their opponents lack an alliterative slogan,
changes which would be necessary to put this bright linebut have nonetheless managed to resist neutrality-ori-
test into effect. Subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunica-ented regulatory proposals so far. In the United States,
tions Act, properly interpreted by the CRTC, can dothe network neutrality controversy has generated more
most of the heavy lifting. However, a minor amendmentheat than light, but north of the border, it has scarcely
to the Telecommunications Act and a public educationgenerated either heat or light. The Canadian Radio-tele-
campaign would also be advantageous.vision and Telecommunications Commission (‘‘CRTC’’)
and the Telecommunications Policy Review (‘‘TPR’’)
have taken a cautious, diffident approach to the issue, no
cabinet minister has taken a stance, 2 and little scholarly I. Network Discrimination: Currentattention has been paid to the matter. Practices  This essay will suggest a normative framework for
the neutrality-oriented regulation of ISP behaviour in etwork neutrality’s various proponents have little
Canada. It will begin in Part I by surveying the actual N in common, but they are all concerned about net-
and potential behaviour of Canadian ISPs to which net- work discrimination. Professor Ed Felten defines net-
work neutrality advocates object. Part II will identify the work discrimination with regard to the way servers treat
efforts of scholars, legislators, and the CRTC to draw a packets which are seeking to be routed through them.3
line between justifiable and unjustifiable ISP discrimina- Under a ‘‘minimal discrimination’’ policy, servers only
tion. Part III will propose a bright line test which could discard or delay packets when it is absolutely necessary
be used to distinguish the ISP behaviour which should to do so because there are too many waiting in the
be constrained from that which should not. In short, queue. All other forms of discrimination (for example,
discrimination that makes the price and quality of ser- giving priority to some packets even when the server is
† 2007, N. Semple. Noel Semple obtained a J.D. degree from the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in 2007. He is currently employed as an articling
student at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP in Toronto. This paper is the winning entry of the 2007 IT.Can Student Writing Competition.
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164 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
not overloaded) are defined by Felten as ‘‘non-minimal’’. toward Shaw’s own VoIP service. Vonage
Minimal discrimination, as defined by Felten, is often Canada (a VoIP provider) filed a complaint with
inevitable, and not a subject of controversy. 4 the CRTC and issued a press release denouncing
the QoS enhancement option as an ‘‘anti-com-Many other forms of ISP discrimination are also
petitive measure aimed at either increasing theuncontroversial. Most ISPs screen data for spam and
perceived cost, or damaging the perceived relia-viruses, and although this is ‘‘non-minimal discrimina-
bility, of the services of independent Internettion’’ (insofar as packets containing viruses will be dis-
telephone service providers when compared tocarded regardless of server congestion), it does not pro-
Shaw’s higher-priced phone service’’. 11voke protests from users. Many Canadian ISPs offer
various speed tiers of broadband Internet service, and " In July 2005, Telus blocked access to ‘‘Voices for
this can be understood as a form of discrimination Change’’, a Web site which supported Telus
between users. Rogers executive Bill Linton recently employees on strike at the time. The site posted
speculated that the number of speed tiers offered by his images of picket line-crossers, and Telus cited
company will grow substantially in the near future.5 Net- privacy and security concerns in blocking it. 12
work neutrality proponents do not generally protest the The blockade persisted for approximately
use of speed tiers. 16 hours, and collaterally affected at least 600
other sites due to Telus’s technical inability toIt is more aggressive forms of discrimination that
blockade only Voices for Change. 13 At least onehave fuelled the controversy. Professor Tim Wu surveyed
other Canadian ISP has targeted a user due todiscriminatory practices by American cable and DSL
the content of the user’s Web site. HostInternet providers in 2002,6 and divided them into two
OnFiber.com, an Alberta ISP, terminated itscategories. ‘‘Contractual’’ discrimination is imposed via
hosting arrangement with slad.net, a site dedi-terms in usage agreements. Such discrimination usually
cated to vampirism. HostOnFiber CEO Andrewforbids users to operate home networks or servers, to use
Snood said that, in terminating the arrangement,the connection for commercial purposes, or to exceed a
he was acting pursuant to a ‘‘personal, moralcertain bandwidth limit. 7 ‘‘Architectural’’ discrimination,
stance, based on my own convictions’’. 14imposed via network administration, primarily consists
of ‘‘asymmetry’’ — making more bandwidth available for Network neutrality advocates see these practices as
downloading than for uploading. both objectionable in of themselves and as the thin edge
of a wedge. They sometimes invoke a ‘‘walled gardens’’Discrimination that is ‘‘non-minimal’’ and ‘‘architec-
nightmare scenario. In this apocalyptic vision, ISPs willtural’’ has become much more pervasive and technologi-
restrict their users to content controlled by or affiliatedcally sophisticated since Wu wrote in 2002. For example,
with the ISP or charge extortionate rates to users whorecently published promotional material for traffic-
wish to ‘‘climb the walls’’ of the garden to access the restshaping software promises that:
of the Internet. 15 This would be a throw-back to the era[u]sing eight different levels of traffic shaping, the . . . policy
of service providers like CompuServe and Americasettings allow organizations to prioritize network traffic for
any IP-based application, including those sensitive to latency Online, whose users were largely confined to ‘‘walled
and jitter such as Voice-over-IP (‘‘VoIP’’), video or real-time gardens’’.
conferencing applications. Data from business-critical appli-
There is no evidence of any such behaviour bycations or from specific groups of users can take prece-
dence. 8 Canadian ISPs. However, modern technology is certainly
capable of imposing such a system. The fact that majorHow have these new technologies been used by
Canadian ISPs such as Bell and Rogers are corporateISPs, and which uses are most objectionable to the net-
siblings of media content-providers may make it morework neutrality advocates? In Canada, three incidents of
tempting for the ISPs to discriminate in favour of con-data discrimination have generated the lion’s share of
tent provided by affiliates, in order to keep the profitscontroversy.
within the corporate family.
" Rogers acknowledged in late 2005 that it prac-
tices ‘‘traffic shaping’’, a form of discrimination,
to restrain the bandwidth consumed by peer-to-
peer file sharing programs such as BitTorrent. 9 II. Justifiable v. Unjustifiable
" Shaw Communications currently offers its Discrimination: Attempts to
broadband customers a $10 per month ‘‘quality Draw the Line of service (QoS) enhancement . . . [to] improve
the quality of Internet telephony services offered etwork neutrality proponents differ widely both in
by third party providers’’. 10 Shaw also offers its N their diagnoses of objectionable ISP discrimina-
own VoIP service, for which no QoS enhance- tion, and in their policy prescriptions to address the
ment is necessary. Some have suggested that the issue. Canada’s TPR argued that ‘‘blocking access to
QoS enhancement is designed to herd cus- applications and content and significant, deliberate deg-
tomers from the VoIP service of third parties radation of service’’ should be restrained by the CRTC.16
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The TPR would give the regulator substantial discretion Markey’s line in the sand, but the practices of Rogers and
over the issue, while instructing it to ‘‘rel[y] on market Shaw described above could certainly come under scru-
forces and customer choice as much as possible’’. 17 tiny. Markey’s Bill did not pass in 2006, but the issue
remains on the agenda in Washington.Michael Powell, former head of the United States
Academics have also sought to draw bright linesFederal Communications Commission (‘‘F.C.C.’’), has
between justifiable and unjustifiable network discrimi-asked ISPs to respect the right of consumers to (i) ‘‘access
nation. In a 2005 article, Professor Tim Wu seeks tothe lawful Internet content of their choice’’; (ii) ‘‘run
‘‘distinguish between classes of restrictions that shouldapplications and use services of their choice, subject to
generally be allowable, and those that might raise suspi-the needs of law enforcement’’; (iii) ‘‘connect their choice
cion’’. 25 Discriminating against viruses is clearlyof legal devices that do not harm the network’’; and (iv)
unproblematic, whereas a network decision to ban low-have ‘‘competition among network providers, applica-
bandwidth ‘‘chat’’ programs on the grounds that they aretion and service providers, and content providers’’. The
‘‘just a waste of time’’ would clearly be illegitimate. 26intellectual lineage of these ‘‘Four Freedoms’’ can be
Between these two extremes, Wu identifies the possi-traced to the 1956 American Hush-a-Phone decision. In
bility that ISPs will seek to charge certain users more, notthat judgment, the D.C. Court of Appeals enshrined a
because they impose higher costs on the ISP, but ratheruser’s ‘‘right reasonably to use his telephone in ways
because the ISPs believe they can be made to pay more.which are privately beneficial without being publicly
Wu argues that while this type of price discrimination isdetrimental’’. 18 The Four Freedoms were a non-binding
not generally anti-competitive, it has a deleteriousstatement of principles, and Powell has made it clear that
‘‘dynamic’’ consequence on the Internet. It impedes thehe does not endorse their legislation or enforcement.
innovation of new applications by tilting a playing fieldThese are relatively modest network neutrality pro- which should be level. 27posals. Neither the TPR nor Powell would seem to
To Professor Wu, ISPs’ attempt to ‘‘manage howobject to Rogers’s traffic-shaping policy or Shaw’s VoIP
users consume bandwidth by discriminating againstQoS premium. However, Telus’s blockade of Voices for
types of usage’’ is a ‘‘laudable goal’’ 28 which comple-Change would probably fall on the wrong side of these
ments network neutrality because it allows new applica-versions of network neutrality regulation.
tions such as VoIP to have the quality of service they
Others have proposed much more aggressive regula- need in order to thrive. However, he argues that it is
tory intervention. Professor Geist’s submission to the better to pursue this goal through ‘‘technological solu-
TPR argued that ‘‘content neutrality in the provision of tions’’ or selling categories of service, rather than forbid-
network services is an absolutely essential principle that ding certain applications. 29 Wu’s general conclusion is
should be firmly established under Canadian law backed that network operators should generally be allowed to
by regulatory oversight and significant penalties for com- ‘‘police what they own’’ (i.e., their local network), but that
pliance failures’’. 19 Videotron CEO Robert Despatie also it might be legitimate to forbid certain types of discrimi-
calls for a big gun, albeit pointed in the opposite direc- nation against Internet applications. 30
tion. He suggested that the federal government impose a
These ideas were further developed in a submissiontariff on high-bandwidth content providers. ‘‘If the movie
to the F.C.C. by Professor Wu and Lawrence Lessig. 31studio were to mail a DVD . . . they would expect to pay
The authors emphasize that a discriminatory networkpostage or courier fees’’, he noted in a November 2006
not only tilts the playing field between today’s applica-speech. ‘‘Why should they not expect a transmission
tions, but also introduces uncertainty among futuretariff?’’ 20 Despatie’s position is that the government
application developers about what forms of discrimina-should not only tolerate content discrimination, it
tion might one day be imposed. Wu and Lessig draw anshould actively enforce it through the tax system.
analogy between the Internet and the electricity system,
In the United States Congress, at least four Bills which works with a common set of standards across
have been introduced to restrain the behaviour of net- North America and works equally well for anything one
work administrators in the name of network neutrality.21 might choose to connect to it. 32 They point to the bene-
Representative Edward Markey’s proposed Network ficial effects of this system for innovation in the elec-
Neutrality Act, 22 for example, would have not only for- tronics industry, and argue that the Internet should have
bade broadband network providers to ‘‘block, impair, the same neutrality.
degrade, discriminate against, or interfere with the ability
of any person to utilize their broadband service’’, 23 but
The CRTC and Network Discrimination would have also required them to ‘‘offer a service such
that . . . [other parties] can offer unaffiliated content, The CTRC is responsible for regulating Canadian
applications, or services in a manner that is at least equal ISPs pursuant to the Telecommunications Act. Subsec-
to the speed and quality of service that the operator’s tion 27(2) of the Act states that
content, applications, or service is accessed and no Canadian carrier shall, in relation to the provision of a
offered’’. 24 It is not entirely clear which forms of network telecommunications service or the charging of a rate for it,
discrimination would have fallen on the wrong side of unjustly discriminate or give an undue or unreasonable
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166 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
preference toward any person, including itself, or subject alternative service provider of the customer’s choice’’. 41
any person to an undue or unreasonable disadvantage. 33 Neither the CRTC’s reconsideration of 2005-2842 nor
The CRTC deals with alleged contraventions of the November 9th 2006 Order-in-Council which over-
subsection 27(2) in two steps. First, the Commission ruled much of it 43 took issue with these findings. While
determines whether discrimination or preference has these two rulings do not suggest that a comprehensive
occurred. If so, it then asks whether or not the discrimi- network neutrality doctrine is developing at the CRTC,
nation or preference was unjust, undue, or unreason- one may emerge in the near future. Among its priorities
able. 34 In two recent cases, the CRTC was asked to apply for the 2007-2008 year, the Commission lists ‘‘address
subsection 27(2) to network neutrality issues. These deci- potential issues in respect of internet access traffic
sions suggest a tentative, ‘‘wait-and-see’’ approach to net- shaping’’. 44
work neutrality on the part of the Commission.
The first decision involved Cybersurf, an ISP which
resells access to the Shaw network. The CRTC had previ- III. Justifiable Discrimination: Usage
ously ordered Shaw to provide this access to Cybersurf. and Congestion-Based  
In November of 2005, Cybersurf asked the CRTC to
hat principles should guide the CRTC’s approachrequire Shaw to give it access to the $10/month QoS W to this issue? It goes almost without saying thatenhancement and to ‘‘PacketCable’’ technology, which
ISP discrimination against viruses or other content dan-major cable companies employed for their own cus-
gerous to users should continue. ‘‘Spam’’ is probably alsotomers but did not make available to Cybersurf. In Sep-
a legitimate target (although reaching a definition oftember 2006, the CRTC denied the application. With
‘‘spam’’ acceptable to both senders and recipients mightregard to the QoS Enhancement (‘‘QSE’’), the Commis-
be somewhat challenging). ISPs should also be allowedsion found ‘‘no evidence that Shaw’s QSE gives its traffic
to do anything that makes the network better, faster, orpreference over Cybersurf’s or any other competitor’s
cheaper for any user without having a negative impacttraffic’’. 35 While PacketCable could potentially give an
on anyone else. Apart from these elementary cases, whatadvantage to the major cable companies over Cybersurf,
other types of discrimination are ‘‘justifiable’’?the CRTC found that requiring the technology to be
shared could allow Cybersurf to monopolize the cable In economic terms, the Internet is a ‘‘club good’’,
companies’ bandwidth. 36 potentially subject to congestion. 45 This means that it
can be shared, but at periods of high demand each addi-The second relevant CRTC ruling was Telecom
tional user reduces the quality of service for all otherDecision 2005-28 (‘‘VoIP decision’’). 37 Yak Communica-
users. 46 Congestion can, however, be reduced if thetions, which was in the business of selling VoIP services
pricing system sends the right signals to consumers. Theusing Canadian broadband networks, was among the
CRTC should encourage the pricing of Internet access inparties participating. Yak argued that the CRTC should
the most efficient and equitable fashion, and ISP pricemake an order forbidding broadband service providers
discrimination that brings us closer to this goal is ‘‘justifi-to
able’’ discrimination.(i) establish contractual terms with their cus-
tomers restraining their access to third-party
Ideal Internet Pricing (‘‘IIP’’)  VoIP providers;
The scholarly consensus regarding congestible(ii) purposefully impair the service quality of
goods is that ‘‘competitive markets will reach an efficientthird-party VoIP providers; or
equilibrium if each user is charged a usage-sensitive price(iii) fail to offer third party VoIP customers the
set equal to their marginal contribution to congestion’’. 47same service quality experienced by their
Thuy Nguyen and Grenville Armitage, applying thisother customers. 38
insight to the Internet, describe the Holy Grail of
The CRTC declined to impose any of these condi- Internet pricing as an ‘‘ideal pricing scheme that is able
tions on the broadband providers. 39 The decision noted to provide different levels of services to different users
the submission of the broadband providers that it was with different needs, charge users only for their per-
not their practice to establish terms of the type described ceived quality of service (‘QoS’) and consumer resources,
by condition (i). Nor was evidence found of intentional [and] support the non-uniformity of Internet traffic with
service degradation or discrimination. The Commission different QoS requirements’’. 48
also suggested that requiring ISPs to provide third party
An IIP regime would have the following characteris-VoIP businesses with access to all of their service-
tics:improving technological innovations might unnecessa-
rily curtail ISPs’ incentive to innovate. 40 The Commis- " The price paid by each Internet user would
sion did, however, put the ISPs on notice that it would in reflect the demands that he or she places upon
the future ‘‘rely on subsection 27(2) of the Act, where the network. Moving more bytes would cost
appropriate, to prohibit a Canadian carrier from more, as would demanding a jitter-free, latency-
restricting its broadband customers from dealing with an free connection. The price charged to the user
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would be proportional to the costs incurred by Distance travelled and vehicle weight correspond to the
ISPs to provide the service required. impact of the travel on the highway, and thereby to the
maintenance costs created by the use. The time of day" Quality of Service guarantees would be available
represents the number of other users who also want tofor a price in proportion to the cost of providing
use the resource at that time. Charging more for use atthem. Under such a system, VoIP users would
peak times creates an incentive to substitute use at otherhave access to the high-quality service they need.
times, and thereby promotes a more efficient usage pat-However their doing so would not slow the net-
tern overall.work for or impose costs on others, because their
price would reflect their costs. 49 Of course, price discrimination is often unpopular
with users. Jeffrey Dale, head of the Ottawa Centre for" Peak-load pricing would apply. Use during high-
Research and Innovation, recently invoked the 407demand times of day imposes external costs on
analogy to make the opposite point.other users in the form of reduced speed. It also
Every now and then, to build a new road that bypassescosts ISPs in the long run, because they must
traffic, they put a toll road in. And that’s a two-tier system.eventually create new capacity which will only
Do we really want that? I tell you, when I’m in Toronto andbe used during high-demand hours. The price I want to get across town, I’ll hop on the 407. But it bugs me
paid to use the network should be proportional that I’m paying for a road. 54
to the total demand on the network at the time We cannot have highways without paying for them;of use. Such a system would reward users for they are enormously expensive, and they do not build orshifting use to off-peak hours, thereby increasing maintain themselves. We can only decide whether tothe overall speed and efficiency of the Internet.50 pay for them with taxes or pay for them with tolls. Roads
Such a regime would have advantages in terms of built with taxes are mostly paid for by people who never
both equity and efficiency. It is equitable for users of an use them, or who place lighter-than-average burdens
Internet application to pay the cost of meeting the upon them. Meanwhile, those who need the highway
bandwidth, jitter, and latency requirements of their most urgently at a given point in time (and who would
application. The network is scarce, expanding it is expen- be willing to pay extra for it) cannot justifiably be given
sive, and different users impose very different demands priority. Paying for superhighways — of either the pave-
upon it. According to one estimate, roughly 5% of ment or information variety — via across-the-board flat
Internet users consume roughly 90% of the bandwidth.51 charges is both inefficient and unjust. Sophisticated
To charge high-requirement users and low-requirement pricing schemes like the 407 model and the IIP
users the same amount is to require the latter to subsi- described above are superior, and the CRTC should tol-
dize the former. 52 The subsidy might take the form of erate, if not encourage, their adoption among Canadian
higher flat access charges (to fund the network expan- Internet service providers. 55
sions required by high-demand users), or it might take
the form of slower speeds. This subsidy might be appro-
Technical Feasibility of IIP  priate if there was a public policy reason to encourage
high-requirement use more than low-requirement use, Even if the IIP described is ‘‘ideal’’, can ISPs afford to
but given that most high-requirement use is for personal implement it? Economists acknowledge that adopting a
entertainment purposes, this is not the case. more efficient pricing regime is only wise if the cost of
implementing and administering the system does notIIP would also encourage the efficient use of a scarce
outweigh the efficiency gains. 56 Two technical challengesresource — bandwidth. Those who develop new applica-
of IIP must be acknowledged.tions should consider and seek to minimize demands on
the network. If users pay the actual costs of their use (as
opposed to a flat rate approximation), they will prefer Distribution of Costs  applications which minimize these costs. Users will also
A high-requirement user does not only impose costsshift their Internet usage to lower-demand periods.
on his or her own ISP. These costs are spread acrossThese responses to price discrimination will encourage
various network administrators. A user’s data is split intothe efficient use of the Internet and maximize social
countless packets, each of which may take a differentwelfare.
route to the destination. Costs are incurred by theAs is often the case with Internet policy, a road owners of each wire over which a part of the data travels.transportation analogy casts light on this argument. This makes it challenging to, for example, provide trueMany features of Ontario’s Highway 407 toll road quality of service guarantees to users. As one expertpricing regime could be usefully imitated by ISPs. The recently explained,price paid by a 407 user is based on: (i) the distance
In order to make it work properly, service providers aroundtravelled; (ii) the weight of the vehicle; and (iii) the time
the world have to agree on giving each other’s top traffic theof day at which the travel occurs.53 Although this pricing same edge when it flows across multiple networks. . . . we
scheme may have been calculated to maximize the oper- would need agreement from all Internet service providers
ator’s profit, it also has substantial efficiency benefits. that when packets are tagged as high priority that we would
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168 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
all treat it [that way] when it comes on our networks and absence of a new pricing protocol among all ISPs, even if
pass it through without delay or minimal delay. 57 they had all the right tools and the intention to apply
However, this challenge is not as severe as it initially ‘‘ideal’’ pricing. Therefore, whatever network administra-
appears. Currently, under ‘‘peering’’ pricing arrange- tion policies an ISP adopts, User A may nonetheless pay
ments, ISPs of approximately the same size agree to carry more or experience slower speeds than User B despite
each others’ traffic free of charge. ISPs of different sizes the fact that A’s impositions on the network are equal to
enter ‘‘transit arrangements’’ whereby smaller ISP ‘‘X’’ or lesser than B’s. Reasonable deviations from ideal
pays a larger ISP ‘‘Y’’ a flat fee to compensate Y for pricing should not be considered violations of subsec-
carrying more of X’s traffic than X does of Y’s traffic. 58 tion 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act, so long as
There is no apparent reason why peering arrangements they were not intentionally caused by the ISP.
could not accommodate the IIP regime described above,
What if an ISP did not intentionally cause aespecially if ISPs are able to reach a consensus protocol
problem, but was negligent or willfully blind in its crea-for providing and pricing Quality of Service. If they are
tion? Professor Felten asks us to consider a hypotheticalunable to do so, then transit arrangements might need to
ISP which is aware that a ‘‘jitter’’ phenomenon occurs onbecome somewhat more complex, so as to allow each
its wires that slows down certain high-demand applica-provider to collect from others the congestion price of
tions. Suppose that ISPtraffic which they originate.
didn’t take any obvious steps to cause the problem but is
happy that it exists, and is subtly managing its network in aCost of Metering  
way that fosters jitter. Network management is complicated,
Ideally, the price of Internet use would be precisely and many management decisions could impact jitter one
way or the other. A network provider who wants to causecalibrated to the congestion that it causes to others.
high jitter can do so, and might have pretextual excuses forHowever, implementing such a system would be chal-
all of the steps it takes. Can regulators distinguish this kindlenging and costly. North American regulators con- of stratagem from the case of fair and justified engineeringfronted a similar challenge when designing pricing decisions that happen to cause a little temporary jitter? 65
regimes for telephone service. 59 The F.C.C. concluded at
This mandate may be challenging for the CRTC.the time that, although metered pricing for telephone
However, the Commission may be assisted by the largecalls would be more efficient, the cost of monitoring and
number of technically sophisticated users who will bebilling use in this way would outweigh the advantage.
ready and willing to complain about unjust discrimina-Professor Yoo argues that, due to the nature of packet-
tion on the part of ISPs. A policy reform which givesswitching technology, ‘‘transaction costs associated with
users the right to not be discriminated against except onmetering Internet traffic are likely to be even more sig-
the basis of ideal pricing will encourage them to vigi-nificant than those associated with local telephone ser-
lantly monitor network speeds and prices, and reportvice ’’. 60 Yoo defends contractual prohibitions on
infractions to the CRTC.bandwidth-intensive network uses as a second-best alter-
native, given the technical difficulty of metering. 61
Arguably, Yoo gives up on the potential benefits of Charging Content Providers  
IIP too quickly. While the technical barriers cannot be
Many ISPs would welcome the opportunity toignored, substantial progress has been made toward
charge providers of high-requirement content, in addi-overcoming them. In Canada, high-speed Internet access
tion to consumers thereof. As noted previously, Video-is already sold in tiers, with users paying more for faster
tron CEO Robert Despatie has called for a tariff onspeeds and higher maximum data transfer. This is a sub-
content providers, the revenues from which would pre-stantial improvement over totally flat pricing, and there
sumably go to ISPs to offset network-expansionis reason to believe that ISPs might be contemplating
charges. 66 Presumably, Google has jumped aboard thefurther moves toward IIP. 62 Professors Nguyen and
net neutrality bandwagon due to an apprehension that,Armitage recently surveyed various Internet pricing
absent regulation, they might eventually be required tomodels, 63 most of which are designed to provide some if
compensate ISPs for the demands placed on the Internetnot all of the characteristics of IIP. For example, under
by Google’s content.the ‘‘smart market’’ system, each packet would have a
header indicating how much the sending party would A high-requirement content provider would obvi-
be willing to pay to ensure the prioritized delivery of the ously prefer a flat-rate Internet pricing regime, which
packet, 64 and congested servers would conduct auctions would allow it to continue receiving subsidies from low-
between packets in the queue. requirement users. However, if IIP were to be imple-
mented, the content provider might be indifferent as to
The Impossibility of Perfection  whether it is the user or the provider who pays. If the
Nonetheless, perfect IIP is not yet technically fea- users pay, they will respond by consuming less high-
sible, because network administration tools are not yet requirement content. It is not clear whether the high-
sufficiently sophisticated. Moreover, a Canadian ISP requirement provider would prefer this outcome to the
might not be able to unilaterally implement IIP in the alternative of paying an IIP price itself.
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Given their ownership of the wires and the lack of censor material based on moral or aesthetic judgments,
any convincing argument to the contrary, ISPs should in as did HostOnFibre in withdrawing web-hosting service
principle be allowed to charge congestion prices to from slad.net. 69
either the provider or the consumer, so long as the total The Internet began as a non-commercial publicamount charged is closely tied to the actual congestion commons, and to a large extent retains this character.impact of the usage. As Georgetown Law Professor Free speech online should not be curtailed by profit-Gregory Sidak observes, oriented private actors. If and when censorship must
There is no basis in economic theory to presume that it occur, it must be public authorities authorized by thewould be socially optimal for end users to pay for all of the due process of law which perform this function. Thecost of building a high-speed broadband network while the
CRTC should treat any discrimination based on an ISP’scompanies that deliver content or applications to those
same end users over that network — and therefore derive legal or moral judgment as a violation of subsec-
substantial economic advantage from its use — pay tion 27(2).
nothing. 67
In Canada, however, there are two practical impedi-
2. Discrimination in favour of owned or affiliatedments to imposing congestion pricing on content prov-
content  iders as opposed to users. Firstly, the parent companies of
Canadian ISPs also own Internet content providers. I will ISPs currently have a financial incentive to discrimi-
argue below that ISPs should not discriminate (other nate in favour of content provided by entities which they
than pursuant to IIP regimes or reasonable approxima- own or with which they are affiliated. 70 Rogers and Bell,
tions thereof) against content provided by their corpo- for example, are owned by corporations which also own
rate parents, and enforcing such a principle is technically content-providers, and might well be tempted to bias
difficult enough. Requiring ISPs to administer neutral IIP their networks in favour of this content. Even a small
pricing to such affiliated content would be even more and independent ISP could be offered money by Con-
challenging. tent Provider X to prioritize X’s data over that of Content
The second impediment is jurisdictional. If Cana- Provider Y. It might make business sense to enter such
dian ISPs were to send CRTC-authorized bills to foreign an arrangement, even if the ISP would lose some cus-
content providers for the congestion impact of their con- tomers in doing so. Shaw’s $10 VoIP QoS Enhancement,
tent, those bills would not be paid. Congestion pricing according to Vonage Canada, constituted discrimination
for content providers could only be introduced through in favour of Shaw’s own VoIP service. 71 In a recent
an international treaty binding, at the very least, the article, Barbara Van Schewick used a comprehensive eco-
United States. In the interim, the equity and efficiency nomic analysis to show that even an ISP with very little
value of congestion pricing can be obtained in a system market power might profit by discriminating in favour
which charges only users. of owned or affiliated content. 72
Subsection 27(2) should be interpreted to forbid
Unjustifiable Discrimination  this type of discrimination. For example, suppose ISP X is
To the extent that it is reasonably technically fea- affiliated with online Game A. Unaffiliated Game B has
sible, every user and content provider should have the the same network requirements (bandwidth, latency,
right to the same speed and the same price as every other jitter, etc.) as Game A. Every Canadian customer of ISP X
user or content provider who places the same technical who uses Game B should have the right to the same
demands on the network when the congestion level is speed of access and same level of network charges as a
equal. In other words, forms of discrimination other than ISP X customer who uses Game A, within the limits of
IIP or approximations thereof are unjustifiable. Specifi- technical feasibility.
cally, the CRTC should interpret subsection 27(2) of the Strong economic arguments support this principle.Telecommunications Act to forbid the following four In their F.C.C. submission, Professors Wu and Lessigtypes of discrimination. emphasize the importance of investment in the develop-
ment of future applications. 73 The Internet is a platform
1. Discrimination based on the ISP’s legal or for competition among these applications, and the com-
moral opinions  petition will be most fruitful for consumers if the plat-
In blockading www.voices-for-change.ca, Telus cited form is level. Professor Van Schewick identifies two ways
privacy and security concerns. Such issues should be left in which discrimination in favour of owned or affiliated
to courts and statutory tribunals, which have the exper- content impedes application innovation by acting as dis-
tise and the legitimate authority to address them. There incentives to investment. Firstly, it allows ISPs to capture
is no justification for vigilante behaviour by an ISP. This some of the profit which would otherwise accrue to the
principle was recognized by recent Criminal Code application innovator, thereby reducing the innovator’s
amendments designed to curtail child pornography, incentive. Secondly, it introduces uncertainty among
which require ISPs to remove material only upon receipt potential innovators, who will come to perceive the
of a court order. 68 It is likewise inappropriate for ISPs to Internet as an unreliable and constantly shifting source
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170 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
of unknown costs. They will respond to the uncertainty right to engage in the forms of discrimination which
by investing less in Internet applications. 74 were defined above as ‘‘unjustifiable’’. The wires and
servers which form the Internet are private property. ISPsMoreover, the Internet is not just a marketplace; it is
have a prima facie right to do whatever they want witha platform for free expression and cultural exchange.
property they paid for, built, and own. Accepting a pay-Canadians should be able to use the Internet to commu-
ment from Yahoo to prioritize its data stream to users isnicate and create without being unduly exploited by ISP
not, they might argue, a particularly heinous abuse. Gro-profiteering. As a matter of principle, it should be just as
cery stores give priority shelf space to cereal brandseasy for a user to access information published by a non-
which pay shelving fees, and can choose to exclude someprofit organization as it is to access the largest multina-
brands completely. Why shouldn’t an ISP be allowed totional’s Web site (assuming that the two Web sites place
do the same with content? A similar argument might bethe same technical demands on the network). This will
made by Mr. Snood, CEO of the Alberta ISP whichnot be true for long if content providers are permitted to
evicted the vampirism Web site slad.net from its server. Ifpay ISPs for express-lane access to users.
it was legal for him to start a magazine and refuse to
print submissions from vampirists on aesthetic grounds,3. Discrimination based on demand inelasticity or why should it be illegal for him to found an ISP andmarket dominance  refuse hosting to them for the same reasons?
Even in the absence of legal/aesthetic judgments or
Public interest arguments can also be adduced ina bias for owned/affiliated content, some ISPs may be
support of this position. This essay’s proposal would cur-tempted to target certain applications while leaving
tail the ability of ISPs to profit from network investmentsothers with equal requirements untouched. One anony-
by making side-payments from content providers andmous visitor to Michael Geist’s Web site claimed that, in
subsidization of corporate siblings via data discrimina-discriminating against certain network uses, ‘‘cable com-
tion illegal. This will tend to reduce the rate of invest-panies targe[t] services that are painful to the consumer if
ment in these networks by reducing the anticipatedthey [are] degraded. Typical users do not care if they have
profit. 78 We must also bear in mind the precedent we setto restart a BitTorrent session to download music —
by curtailing profits in this way. Entrepreneursthey do care if their long distance telephone service is
throughout the economy could be deterred from inno-poor’’. 75 While this allegation is unsubstantiated, it is
vating for fear that their profits too might eventually beplausible that ISPs might charge higher rates or offer
confiscated by regulators.poorer service to certain users simply because they do
not believe that those users will respond by switching to In response, it should first be noted that the impact
a different ISP. Given the limited competition between of the proposed regulations on profit may be negligible,
broadband ISPs in Canada, it seems unlikely that the given that there is no clear case of a Canadian ISP having
market alone can discipline this type of ‘‘unjustifiable’’ profited from ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination. Moreover,
discrimination. The four largest Canadian ISPs (Bell, the anti-regulation arguments lose much of their force
Rogers, Shaw, and Telus) together received 63% of retail when the highly regulated context of the industry is
Internet access revenues in 2005, an increase from 44% considered. Broadband networks have been profitable in
in 2001. 76 part courtesy of subsidies from the public delivered by
the CRTC.79 The recent case of Federation of Canadian
4. Absolute blockades of legal and safe content  Municipalities v. AT & T Canada Corp. provides an
interesting example. 80 Ledcor Inc. was unable to con-Apart from material which is spam, dangerous, or
vince Vancouver to permit it to lay cable on municipalillegal, absolute blockades of content should be for-
property. The CRTC obligingly compelled the city to dobidden. Even ‘‘justifiable’’ IIP-oriented discrimination
so in exchange for a nominal payment, relying on sec-should not take the form of a total blockade. Every legal
tions 44 and 64(2) of the Telecommunications Act. Thisand non-destructive use should be available at some
decision constituted a subsidization of Ledcor at theprice and at some speed. Subsection 27(2) of the Tele-
expense of Vancouver municipal ratepayers, who wouldcommunications Act should be interpreted so as to
have benefited had their municipality been able to nameforbid all absolute blockades.
its price for the access sought by Ledcor. 81 In a regulated
industry like telecommunications, corporations receiveThe Justification for Regulation  
subsidies from the public but must also anticipate specialThis paper’s ‘‘bright line’’ test proposes to permit constraints on their profitability such as the neutralityprice discrimination based on network demands, while regulations proposed by this paper.forbidding many other forms of discrimination. This
would seem to accommodate the most common ISP Nonetheless, we must still weigh the benefits of
argument against network neutrality regulation — that new regulation against its innovation-deadening costs.
someone needs to pay for the Internet, and that those For two reasons, cost-benefit analysis supports regulation
who place the heaviest burdens on it should pay their in the case of network neutrality, but not in the case of
fair share. 77 However, an ISP might plausibly claim the the supermarket shelves cereal-stocking situation men-
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tioned previously. Firstly, the Internet is a platform not further action need be taken on the net neutrality file in
only for commerce, but also for democracy and culture. Canada. Refraining from further neutrality regulation at
Excessive ISP discrimination, therefore, risks skewing not this point in time would have the virtue of allowing
just cereal purchases, but also our intellectual firmament maximum discretion to the regulator in the face of rapid
and our creative process. technological change.
More importantly, permitting discrimination always However, subsection 27(2) is highly ambiguous.
undermines innovation, even in the grocery store. Among the enormous variety of possible traffic shaping
Someone who invents a fantastic new cereal may not be and bandwidth management policies, it is far from clear
able to get it into the consumer’s line of vision without today which the Commission considers ‘‘unjust’’ dis-
coming up with the shelving fee demanded by the gro- crimination, ‘‘undue’’ preference, or ‘‘unreasonable’’ pref-
cery store. This barrier to entry is deleterious for con- erence. 84 Allowing this ambiguity to persist has two
sumers, because they are less likely to be exposed to an important deleterious consequences.
outstanding product which they would prefer over the The first is business uncertainty. Canadian carriersmarket incumbent. However, the benefit to the con- and content providers will be able to plan more effi-sumer of regulating cereal-shelf neutrality is negligible, ciently if they are given some certainty about what formsgiven how little they have to gain from switching cereals. of discrimination will be allowed. In the absence of it,The benefit of regulation (more cereal choice for con- they may make inefficient investment decisions. If ‘‘justi-sumers) is outweighed by the cost (infringement of gro- fiable’’ discrimination is to be permitted (as I argue itcery stores’ private property rights and negative impact should), then application developers should be madeon future grocery store investment). The opposite is true aware of this as soon and as unequivocally as possible.of the proposed network neutrality regulation. The This will encourage them to give due weight to theadvantages of allowing users to choose between applica- necessity of economizing on bandwidth as they developtions competing on a level playing field are enormous. new applications.The profound economic benefits which the Internet has
Secondly, the rule of law is better served by greaterproduced to date would arguably have been impossible
clarity. Although some discretion must be retained byin the absence of net neutrality.
the decision-maker in every administrative process, whenThese arguments help explain the economic ratio-
it is possible to enunciate broad principles, we should donale for network neutrality regulation. They do not,
so. The ‘‘bright line’’ test stated above is just such a broadhowever, provide us with a response for Mr. Snood, who
principle. The Telecommunications Policy Reviewmight claim the same right to exclude aesthetically
echoes this point with its argument that ‘‘Canada’s tele-objectionable content from his servers as he would have
communications legislation should provide a clearerto exclude it from a magazine. The CRTC’s moral
direction on when regulation is required as well as onauthority to prevent ISPs from discriminating on the
the nature and extent of regulatory measures’’. 85basis of legal and ethical judgments comes from the
doctrine of the ‘‘common carrier’’. Common carriers are
exempted from liability for libellous or otherwise illegal Three Necessary Changes  
content they carry, but in return, they are forbidden to
Only three modest legal reforms would be neces-interfere with that content. Section 36 of the Telecom-
sary to give effect to this essay’s proposal. Firstly, themunications Act provides that ‘‘except where the Com-
Telecommunications Act was written for the telephonemission approves otherwise, a Canadian carrier shall not
age, not the Internet age. The two sections of the Actcontrol the content or influence the meaning or purpose
relevant to the net neutrality issue, sections 27(2) and 36,of telecommunications carried by it for the public’’. 82
apply only to ‘‘Canadian carriers’’, a term defined in theTelus and Hostonfibre.com may have violated this sec-
Act to include only those who use, own, or operate ation by discriminating against Voices for Change and
‘‘transmission facility’’ in order to ‘‘provide telecommuni-slad.net, respectively.
cations services to the public for compensation’’. 86 This
excludes a number of companies which might be in a
position to engage in Internet discrimination, such asIV. Proposed Legal Reforms  Vonage and Primus. The Telecommunications Act
should be amended so as to add ‘‘Internet Service Pro-
Is the Existing Statute Sufficient?  vider’’ to the definitions. ISPs should be defined so as to
include anyone in a position to control the flow of databove, this essay discussed the CRTC’s efforts to
on the Internet. The phrase ‘‘or internet service provider’’A address the network neutrality issue using subsec-
should then be added to sections 27(2) and 36, after thetion 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act. No contra-
words ‘‘Canadian carrier’’.vention was found in the Cybersurf and VoIP decisions,
but the CRTC did put ISPs on notice that the ‘‘issue can Secondly, The CRTC should issue an order indi-
. . . be addressed by the Commission on a case-by-case cating that it will interpret subsection 27(2) so as to
basis, should it arise’’. 83 One might argue that that no prohibit ‘‘unjustifiable’’ discrimination as defined above,
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172 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology
but specifically authorizing ISPs to engage in ‘‘justifiable’’ as transparent and comprehensible as possible to con-
discrimination. sumers.
Thirdly, the CRTC or another federal agency needs An excellent model for this consumer-educationto launch a consumer education campaign. One advan- mission is the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada’stage of flat-rate Internet pricing regimes is their sim- ‘‘Credit Cards and You’’ Web site. 88 Like Internet access,plicity. Any movement toward the complex ideal credit cards are priced in a very complex fashion whichdescribed above increases the likelihood of consumer can easily confuse consumers. The FCAC has respondedconfusion. For example, Rogers Communications Inc. with an excellent Web site which compares credit cardscurrently sells four tiers of high-speed Internet access to available in Canada. 89 The CRTC or the Ministry ofusers in Toronto. It costs $12 per month to upgrade from Industry should launch a similar initiative for Internet‘‘lite’’ to ‘‘express’’ service. According to Rogers’s ‘‘Product access.Comparison’’ page, the only service enhancement which
a user receives in return for this upgrade is four addi- The intellectual ferment stimulated by the TPR
tional e-mail accounts. 87 Presumably the service is faster, makes this a good time for federal authorities to develop
but how much faster? How much time will the average an intelligent network neutrality policy. The issue has
user save on a given task or application? not yet been consumed in hyperbole as it has south of
Rogers’s speed tiers represent a very minor deviation the border, and this may facilitate a thoughtful approach.
from flat-rate pricing. However, even this small step is so This paper has suggested that efficient price discrimina-
poorly explained by the ISP that Canadian consumers tion should be tolerated and encouraged, while most
are completely unable to make informed decisions other forms of discrimination should be curtailed. This
about upgrading. How much more difficult will it be for model, the application of which would require only a
consumers to understand a complex ideal Internet few minor reforms, could be an important building
pricing scheme of the type described above? The CRTC block for an efficient and equitable Canadian telecom-
must ensure that ISPs’ price discrimination regimes are munications policy.
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